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Abstract
In this paper, we consider infinite number of non atomic self-interested
agents with private valuation of a divisible good. We design a pricing
mechanism that is easy to implement, is individually rational, weakly bud-
get balanced and incentive compatible. In this mechanism, agents send
reports of their types, based on which, the designer solves a constrained
optimization problem through Lagrange’s mechanism. The resulting op-
timal allocation and Lagrange’s multiplier is sent as the allocation and
prices to the respective agent. We show that reporting one’s type truth-
fully is a dominant strategy of the players in this mechanism. We then
extend this idea to the dynamic case, when player’s types are dynamically
evolving as a controlled Markov process. In this case, in each time period,
reporting one’s type is a dominant strategy of the players.
1 Introduction
Internet is ubiquitous these days with ever increasing number of smartphones
and computers. There is a large and very complex interaction of people with
each other, with the government and the firms. Thus it is quite an important
problem to design large scale systems such that when interacted upon by peo-
ple, who are self-interested agents and try to maximize their own utilities, the
outcome is desirable to the planner. One of the common formulations is to max-
imize sum of the utilities of all the agents, also called social welfare or network
utility [1].
In practice, a system designer does not have complete information to max-
imize the social welfare directly, while agents may have incentive to misreport
such information so as to manipulate the system outcomes to their own advan-
tages. Consequently, mechanism design has been proposed as an engineering
side of game theory which aims to design games such that when played by
the self-interested agents while the induced game-theoretic equilibrium leads
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to social welfare maximization in an efficient allocation. One such celebrated
mechanism is Vickery Clark Grove (VCG) Mechanism [2, 3, 4] that ensures that
truthfully revealing each agent’s information is a dominant strategy. However,
there are two main drawbacks that prevent VCG Mechanism from being practi-
cally implemented in large-scale systems, namely unaffordable communications
and computation overheads. In particular, VCG Mechanism may incur signifi-
cantly communication overheads since it requires each agent to submit its entire
utility function carrying infinitely many messages. Related research efforts (e.g.
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]) have been proposed towards resolving such an is-
sue, in which case users are only required to submit limited messages while the
social welfare is maximized at the induced equilibria. The second main issue
of VCG Mechanism that this work considers is the computation issue: as the
number of agents becomes large, it becomes difficult to compute the optimal ac-
tion and implement VCG mechanism. Authors in [5] consider a dynamic mean
field model for large scale auctions, where it showed that each agent reports
truthfully according to her conjoint valuation.
In this paper, we consider the problem of mechanism design where there
are a large number of homogeneous players. Each player has a type which
is her private information. She takes an action to report of her type to the
system designer who, based on everyone’s type, allocates good and prices to
the individuals. We present an incentive compatible (IC) mechanism where
truthfully reporting one’s type is a dominant strategy of a player. Moreover,
the mechanism is individually rational (IR) and also weakly balances budget
(BB). We then consider where types of the players are dynamically evolving
through a controlled Markov process. In this case, we extend our previous
mechanism to this dynamic setting such that revealing one’s type in each time
period is a dominant strategy of the players. As before, the mechanism is IC,
IR and weakly BB.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and re-
vise the VCG mechanism. In Section 3, we present the mechanism for the static
setting. In Section 4, we consider the case when player’s types are dynamically
evolving and extend our previous mechanism to that setting. We conclude in
Section 5.
2 System Model
Consider a system with a set of I = {1, ..., I} agents. Each agent i has a type
θi ∈ T , where |T | is finite. Type-θi user’s received allocation is xθi . The resource
allocation constraint is given by x ∈ X . Type-t1 users’ utilities: U(θi, xi).
In the following, we revise the VCG mechanism.
Mechanism 1 (VCG Mechanism). Each user sends a report of its type t˜i and
auctioneer selects the allocation x∗(t˜) such that
x
∗(t˜) = argmax
x∈X
∑
i∈I
U(t˜i, xi). (1)
2
DSIC: Each user’s (effective) payoff satisfies
U(θi, x
∗
i (θ˜)) +
∑
j 6=i
U(t˜i, x
∗
j (t˜)) ≤ max
x∈X

U(θi, xi) +∑
j 6=i
U(t˜j , xj)

 . (2)
Note that, from (1), maxx∈X
[
U(θi, xi) +
∑
j 6=i U(t˜j , xj)
]
is achieved when
type-θi users reveal their truthful type, i.e., t˜i = θi. Hence, truthful reporting
is each type-θi user’s optimal strategy, regardless of the decisions of all other
types of users.
3 Large-Scale Mechanism Design
Let ρj , ∀j ∈ T be the portion of type j users i.e. ρj =
∑I
i=1
1(θi=θ
j)
I
.
Lemma 1. The VCG Payment for user i converges to λ∗xi when I →∞, where
λ∗ is the optimal dual variable corresponding to the constraint of the following
social welfare maximization problem:
max
x
∑
i∈I
Ui(xi) (3a)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
xi ≤ C. (3b)
Proof: Let
U−i(x−i) ,
∑
j 6=i
Uj(t˜j , xj)
x˜−i = arg max
x−i∈X−i
U−i(x−i). (4)
The VCG payment for user i is given by:
hi(t˜i, θ˜−i) = −
∑
j 6=i
Uj(t˜j , x
∗
j (θ˜)) + max
xi∈X−i
∑
j 6=i
Uj(t˜j , xj)
=
∫
x˜−i
x
∗
−i
∇x−iU−i(x−i)dx−i
=
∫ 1
0
∇x−iU−i((1− t)x
∗
−i + tx˜−i)[(1− t)x
∗
−i + tx˜−i]dt. (5)
Note that, as I →∞,
U−i((1 − t)x
∗
−i + tx˜−i) = U−i(x
∗
−i), ∀t ∈ [0, 1]. (6)
Hence, from (29), we have
hi(t˜i, θ˜−i) = λ
∗x∗i . (7)
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Lemma 2. There exists a function fi = λ
∗x∗i such that truthfully reporting
one’s type is a dominant strategy for a player.
To show this, consider the following mechanism:
Mechanism 2 (Large-Scale VCG Mechanism). • Message Space: each agent
i reports its type θ˜i ∈ T ;
• Allocation Outcome: let ρ∗j (θ˜) be the portion of reported type-j agents for
all j ∈ T . The auctioneer solves the following problem:
max
z
∑
j∈T
ρ∗j (θ˜)U(j, zj) (8a)
s.t.
∑
j∈T
ρ∗j (θ˜)zj ≤ C. (8b)
Let z∗(θ˜) be the optimal primal solution and p∗(θ˜) be the optimal dual
solution. Each agent i receives an allocation
x∗i (θ˜) = z
∗
t˜i
(θ˜), (9)
and needs to pay
h∗i (θ˜) = p
∗(θ˜)z∗
t˜
(θ˜). (10)
We next prove such a mechanism achieves dominant-strategy incentive com-
patibility.
Proof. Given all other agents’ reports’ θ˜−i, each agent’s payoff maximization
problem is:
max
t˜i∈T
Pi(t˜i, θ˜−i) , Ui(x
∗
i (t˜i, θ˜−i))− p
∗(t˜i, θ˜−i)x
∗
i (t˜i, θ˜−i). (11)
Note that p∗(·) is determined in (24). As I → ∞, the value of ρ∗j (θ˜) remains
the same even if agent i solely deviates from reporting t˜i, so does p
∗(θ˜). Hence,
we can safely remove t˜i from p
∗(·).
Note that each agent’s payoff in (27) is bounded by
Pi(t˜i, θ˜−i) ≤ max
xi≥0
Ui(xi)− p
∗(θ˜−i)xi, (12)
which can be readily shown by contradiction. In addition, the maximizer
xoi (θ˜−i) of maxxi≥0 Ui(xi)− p
∗(θ˜i)xi satisfies
∂Ui(x
o
i (θ˜−i))
xi
= p∗(θ˜−i), ∀i ∈ I. (13)
By analyzing the KKT conditions of (24), xoi (θ˜−i) is exactly achieved when
agent i reports t˜i = θi, i.e., x
o
i (θ˜−i) = x
∗
i (t˜i, θ˜
∗
−i), and, from (27),
Pi(θi, θ˜−i) = Ui(x
o
i (θ˜−i))− p
∗(θ˜−i)x
o
i (θ˜−i) = max
xi≥0
Ui(xi)− p
∗(θ˜i)xi. (14)
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From (28), we see that the truthful report t˜i = θi maximizes agent i’s pay-
off. Therefore, the Large-Scale VCG Mechanism achieves dominant-strategy
incentive compatibility.
We next prove the remaining two properties, namely Individual Rationality
(IR) and weakly Budget Balance (BB).
Proposition 1. The Large-Scale VCG Mechanism satisfies IR and weakly BB.
Proof. The dual variable p∗(θ˜) is positive, and so is every user i’s payment
hi(θ˜). This shows that weakly BB is satisfied.
From (14), each agent’s payoff when truthful reporting satisfies
Pi(θi, θ˜−i) = max
xi≥0
Ui(xi)− p
∗(θ˜i)xi ≥ Ui(0)− p
∗(θ˜i) · 0 = 0, (15)
which shows that IR is achieved.
4 Dynamic Large-Scale VCG Mechanism
In this section, we generalize the idea of the large-scale mechanism into dynamic
environments.
The utility function ui of agent i is
Pi(xt, hi,t, θi,t) = ui(zt, θi,t)− hi,t, (16)
where θi,t for agent i is a general Markov process, where the Markov processes
of agents are independent across agents.
P (θi,t+1|θ1:t, z1:t) = Q(θi,t+1|θi,t, zi,t) (17)
All agents discount the future with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
The socially efficient policy is obtained by maximizing the expected discounted
of valuations.
The socially optimal program starting in period t at state ρt can be written
as
W (ρt) , max
zt∈Z

∑
j∈J
ρj,tui(zi,t, θj,t) + E

 ∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
∑
j∈J
ρj,sui(zi,s, θj,s)|ρt, zt




(18)
= max
zt∈Z

∑
j∈J
ρj,tui(zi,t, θj,t) + δE [W (ρt+1)|ρt, zt]

 (19)
Define an optimum policy of the designer zot as
z
o
t (ρt) = arg max
zt∈Z

∑
j∈J
ρj,tui(zi,t, θj,t) + δE [W (ρt+1)|ρt, zt]

 , (20)
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Also define for a Markovian policy σ for a user, her utility to go Uσi (zi,t, θi,t, ρt)
such that, for zi,t = σ(θi,t, ρt),
Uσi (zi,t, θi,t, ρt) = ui(zi,t, θi,t) + E

 ∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
∑
j∈J
θj,tui(z
o
i,s(ρs), θj,s)|θi,t, zi,t, ρt


(21)
= ui(zi,t, θi,t) + δE

∑
j∈J
θj,t+1U
σ
i (zi,t+1, θj,t+1, ρt+1)|θi,t, zi,t, ρt


(22)
W (ρt) can be rewritten as
W (ρt) , max
zt∈Z
∑
j∈J
ρj,tui(zi,t, θj,t) + δE [W (ρt+1)|ρt, zt]
= max
zt
∑
j∈J
ρj,tU
σ
i (zi,t, θi,t, ρt) (23)
Mechanism 3 (Dynamic Large-Scale VCG Mechanism). • Message Space:
each agent i reports its type θ˜i,t ∈ T ;
• Allocation Outcome: let ρ∗j (θ˜t) be the portion of reported type-j agents for
all j ∈ T . The auctioneer solves the following problem:
max
zt∈Z
∑
j∈T
ρ∗j,t(θ˜)U(zj , θj,tρt) (24a)
s.t.
∑
j∈T
ρ∗j,t(θ˜)zj ≤ C. (24b)
Let z∗t (θ˜t) be the optimal primal solution and p
∗
t (θ˜t) be the optimal dual
solution. Each agent i receives an allocation
x∗i,t(θ˜) = z
∗
θ˜i
(θ˜), (25)
and needs to pay
h∗i,t(θ˜) = p
∗
t (θ˜)z
∗
θ˜i
(θ˜). (26)
Given all other agents’ reports’ θ˜−i, each agent’s payoff to go maximization
problem is:
max
θ˜i,t∈T
Pi,t(θ˜i,t, θ˜−i, ρt) , Ui,t(x
∗
i,t(θ˜i,t, θ˜−i,t), θ˜i,t, ρ
∗
t (θ˜t))− p
∗
t (θ˜i,t, θ˜−i,t)x
∗
i,t(θ˜i,t, θ˜−i,t).
(27)
Note that p∗t (·) is determined in (24). As I → ∞, the value of ρ
∗
j (θ˜) remains
the same even if agent i solely deviates from reporting t˜i, so does p
∗
t (θ˜). Hence,
we can safely remove t˜i,t from p
∗(·).
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Note that each agent’s payoff in (27) is bounded by
Pi,t(t˜i, θ˜−i, ρt) ≤ max
zi,t≥0
U(θi,t, zi,t, ρt)− p
∗
t (θ˜−i)zi,t, (28)
which can be readily shown by contradiction. In addition, the maximizer
xoi,t(θ˜−i) of maxxi,t≥0 U(θi,t, zi,t, ρt)− p
∗
t (θ˜i)zi,t satisfies
∂U(θi,t, zi,t, ρt)
zi,t
= p∗t (θ˜−i), ∀i ∈ I. (29)
By analyzing the KKT conditions of (24), xoi,t(θ˜−i,t) is exactly achieved when
agent i reports θ˜i,t = θi,t, i.e., x
o
i,t(θ˜−i,t) = x
∗
i (θ˜i,t, θ˜
∗
−i,t), and, from (27),
Pi(θi,t, θ˜−i,t) = Ui,t(x
o
i (θ˜−i,t))−p
∗
t (θ˜−i,t)x
o
i,t(θ˜−i,t) = max
xi,t≥0
Ui,t(xi,t)−p
∗
t (θ˜t)xi,t.
From (28), we see that the truthful report θ˜i,t = θi,t maximizes agent i’s pay-
off. Therefore, the Dynamic Large-Scale VCG Mechanism achieves dominant-
strategy incentive compatibility.
Proposition 2. The Dynamic Large-Scale VCG Mechanism satisfies IR and
weakly BB.
Proof. The dual variable p∗t (θ˜) is positive, and so is every user i’s payment
hi,t(θ˜t). This shows that weakly BB is satisfied.
From (14), each agent’s payoff when truthful reporting satisfies
Pi,t(θi,t, θ˜−i,t) = max
xi,t≥0
Ui,t(xi,t)− p
∗
t (θ˜i,t)xi,t ≥ Ui,t(0)− p
∗
t (θ˜i,t) · 0 ≥ 0, (30)
which shows that IR is achieved.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered both static and dynamic models where players have
private types that parameterize their utilities. We presented mechanisms that
incentivize the users to reveal their private types, which are incentive compati-
ble, individually rational and weakly budget balanced.
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